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Why the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007
Falls Short, and How It Could Be Improved
Rand Robins
This paper will analyze the nexus between the regulation of lobbying activities and
campaign finance, in particular the foggy and perhaps dubious realm of the lobbyist’s role in
campaign finance.1 Legislative lobbying and campaign finance are policed at the federal level
by the amended Lobbying Disclosure Act2 (“LDA”) and Federal Election Campaign Act,3
respectively. The Supreme Court has recognized that each of these activities implicates
analogous First Amendment issues, namely, the right to petition the government, the freedom of
speech, and the freedom of association, but has afforded more deference to campaign finance
laws while subjecting lobbying regulation to more searching review.4 Apart from federal
regulation that has generally addressed lobbying and campaign finance separately,5 some states
have adopted creative and unique laws aimed primarily at the interaction of lobbying and
campaign finance.6
Congress recently took its first step toward legislative recognition of the potentially
corrupting interplay between these constitutionally protected activities when it passed the Honest

1

See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105,
107 (2008) (“When they occur together, lobbying and campaign contributions can compound the dangers of undue
influence that each practice presents separately.”).
2
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1612
(2008)), amended by Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735.
3
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A.
§§ 431-41 (2008)).
4
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (holding that campaign finance restrictions implicate the most
fundamental First Amendment activities of freedom of speech and association); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 627 (1954) (holding that First Amendment freedoms are involved in the assessment of lobbying regulation).
5
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 119-20.
6
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.226 (2007) (requiring the reporting and disclosure of all bundled
contributions, without specifically targeting lobbyists); MINN. STAT. § 10A.27 (2007) (capping the fraction of total
contributions a candidate can receive from a category of donors comprised of lobbyists, PACs, political funds, and
large contributors).
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Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (“HLOGA”),7 which amended the LDA in the
wake of high-profile lobbying scandals.8 The major issue with respect to these activities that has
yet to be fully accounted for in federal law is that lobbyists active in campaign finance are in a
position to exert undue influence on elected officials above and beyond influence exerted
through each activity separately. Because lawmakers already turn to lobbyists on a regular basis
for substantive guidance on complex legislation, those lobbyists who contribute large sums to
political campaigns can potentially unbalance the democratic process to an extent that justifies
substantial limitations on activities that are protected by the First Amendment.
This paper will examine the track record of federal and state lobbying and campaign
finance laws, as well as related First Amendment litigation, and propose alternative regulatory
regimes accounting for the concerns raised when lobbying and campaign finance intersect. The
scope of this paper will be limited in large measure by focusing on the HLOGA registration and
disclosure provisions, and addressing campaign finance law tangentially where appropriate.9
Intended to bring greater transparency to the inner-workings of government, some of these
provisions actually facilitate the potential of a small number of lobbyists to distort the political
process.10
Part I of this paper will provide an overview of the HLOGA and subsequent commentary
on the amendments. Part II will discuss some the concerns raised by the combination of
7

See Briffault, supra note 1, at 119-20 (noting that a “signal feature of the 2007 federal lobbying law is the
requirement that federal candidate campaign committees, political party committees, and leadership PACs disclose”
bundled contributions from federally-registered lobbyists in excess of $15,000 in a six-month period).
8
See H.R. REP. NO. 110-161(I), at 9 (2007) [hereinafter House Report] (“[The LDA’s] shortcomings were
highlighted during the 109th Congress by the conviction of a high-profile lobbyist, as well as a number of highly
publicized incidents” involving gifts to government officials “in exchange for favorable treatment for clients with
specific interests before the Government.”).
9
For an overview that informed the discussion of campaign finance laws in this paper, see Audra L. Wassom,
Campaign Finance Legislation: McCain-Feingold/Shays-Meehan – The Political Equality Rationale and Beyond,
55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1781 (2002).
10
See infra, note 95. 6% of federally registered lobbyists accounted for 83% of all lobbyists’ campaign
contributions.
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lobbying and campaign finance activity. In Part III, this paper will look at some innovative
approaches to the problem adopted by state legislatures and suggest changes to the federal
regime that would guard against improper influence on the democratic process without undue
infringement on First Amendment rights. Part IV concludes that more effective requirements are
needed to promote transparency and public faith in the legislative process.

Part I: The Federal Approach
Registration Requirements
The federal government’s primary means of regulating lobbyist conduct is to require that
lobbyists disclose their contact information, their clients’ information, and, to the maximum
extent practicable, the specific bill numbers and executive branch actions on which they
lobbied.11 The HLOGA requires individuals and their employers to register with the House
Clerk and Senate Secretary within forty-five days of making his or her first “lobbying contact,”
unless the individual or firm earns less than $2,500 from, or spends less than $10,000 on,
“lobbying activities”12 in a given four-month period.13
A “lobbying contact” means any oral or written communication to a covered executive or
legislative branch official,14 made on behalf of a client with regard to the “formulation,
modification, or adoption” of federal legislation, regulation, or the administration of a federal
program or policy, including the negotiation and awarding of federal contracts.15 Public
11

Briffault, supra note 1, at 112.
“‘[L]obbying activities’ means lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation
and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in
contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.” 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(7).
13
2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a).
14
2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(3)-(4) defines “Covered executive or legislative branch official,” which covers the President
and Vice-President, Members of Congress, their staffs, policy advisors, as well as any member of the uniformed
services at or above a certain pay grade.
15
2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(8)(A).
12
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speeches and articles, requests for meetings or the status of an action, testimony to government
bodies included in the public record, information provided in response to a request by a covered
official for specific information, statements submitted during public comment periods, and
statements by tax-exempt religious organizations are not “lobbying contacts.”16
The registration filing must state contact information for the lobbyist, the client, and any
entity other than the client that contributes more than $5,000 per quarter to fund lobbying
activities or actively participates in planning or managing lobbying activities.17 If other
contributing organizations are listed on the client’s publicly accessible Web site as contributors,
their disclosure is not required.18 Disclosure of any information about individuals who are
members of, or contribute to, a client or an organization that contributes to a client is explicitly
exempted. Additionally, the filing must state the general issue areas and, to the extent
practicable, the specific issues on which the registrant expects to engage in lobbying.19 Finally,
the filing must indicate whether any employees of the registrant worked as a covered executive
or legislative branch official in the twenty-year period leading up to that filing.20

Quarterly Reports
Registration is only the first step of the disclosure process. Each registrant must file a
quarterly lobbying activity report with the House Clerk and Senate Secretary.21 Most notably,
quarterly reports must (1) include a list of the specific issues on which the registrant engaged in
lobbying activities and, “to the maximum extent practicable,” a list of bill numbers and

16

§ 1602(8)(B).
2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
§ 1603(b)(6).
21
2 U.S.C.A. § 1604.
17
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references to executive branch actions; (2) indicate which chamber of Congress or agency was
contacted; (3) include a good faith estimate of lobbying-related earnings and expenditures; and
(4) identify any State or local governments on whose behalf the registrant lobbied.22

Fundraising Disclosure
One area in which lobbying and campaign finance regulations overlap under the HLOGA
is in their treatment of “bundled” contributions. “Bundling” occurs when an entity, either an
individual or an organization, on its own initiative, receives numerous campaign contributions
and then delivers the collective sum, which often far exceeds campaign contribution limits on
individuals, to a candidate on the donors’ behalf.23 The intended result is that the delivering
lobbyist will earn “credit” from the candidate for the large donation.24 Those making “bundled”
contributions must file a report with the Federal Election Commission within thirty days of the
transfer of money to the candidate.25 The recipient candidate must identify the bundler with each
contribution received on his or her campaign reports.26 Under the HLOGA amendments,
leadership PACs and party committees must report additional information about bundled
contributions over $15,000 provided by a registered federal lobbyist during a reporting period if
that lobbyist delivers two or more bundled contributions.27

22

§ 1604(b).
See Chip Nielsen & Jason D. Kaune, Corporate Political Activities 2008: Complying with Campaign Finance,
Lobbying & Ethics Laws, 1689 PLI/Corp 13, 38, Sept. 11-12, 2008.
24
See HLOGA, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204(8).
25
See Nielsen & Kaune, supra note 23, at 38.
26
Id.
27
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(i).
23
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Policy Rationale
Public disclosure of lobbying information can work as “a powerful disinfectant” against
rule breaking and shortcutting the formal policy-making process.28 Disclosing the identities of
lobbyists benefits several distinct groups, the first of which is lawmakers and government
officials dealing with an increasingly complex and nuanced array of issues.29 Lobbyists provide
focused expertise and analysis that help public officials make informed decisions and often
bridge the gaps in divided and gridlocked government.30 Moreover, information available from
disclosure reports can shed light on the motivation, extent, and nature of lobbying activities to
enterprising lawmakers and their staffs.31
Of primary importance to the Supreme Court in considering a First Amendment
challenge to the LDA’s predecessor was that disclosure benefits lawmakers themselves.32 In
United States v. Harriss, the Court explained that “[p]resent-day legislative complexities are
such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to
which they are regularly subjected,” and that disclosure allows lawmakers “to know who is being
hired, who is putting up the money, and how much” with regard to lobbyists’ overtures.33
Advocacy by lobbyists and information about the extent and nature of their activities
helps lawmakers engage in a fact-finding process, much like a judge or jury would assess the

28

See Nicolas W. Allard, Lobbying Is An Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to be
Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 29 (2008). Mr. Allard is a partner co-chairing the Public Policy and
Administrative Law Department at Patton Boggs LLP, a firm recognized by the Washington Post as the most
powerful lobbying firm in Washington, DC. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbying Is Lucrative. Sometimes Very, Very
Lucrative, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2007, at A11.
29
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 116-117.
30
See Allard, supra note 28, at 42.
31
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 119 (“[D]isclosure is particularly valuable in the lobbying context because it gives
legislators a greater understanding of the pressures to which they are subject.”). This argument is of questionable
validity. If lawmakers and their staffs are so pinched for time that they rely on lobbyists for substantive information,
it is highly unlikely that they have the time or motivation to sift through the mountain of data contained in disclosure
reports to perform some sort of background check on the lobbyists walking them through the legislative process.
32
Harriss, supra note 4, at 625.
33
Id.
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credibility of a witness based not only on the witness’ direct examination, but also on his
responses under cross examination, and perhaps his criminal or financial record, or even his
demeanor on the stand. As Senator Hubert Humphrey explained, “the right to be heard does not
automatically include the right to be taken seriously.”34 The most effective, and often the best
compensated lobbyists work hard to establish and maintain their credibility with lawmakers, just
as a trial lawyer would with a judge.35
The second distinct facet of society benefited by disclosure is the universe of interest
groups and organizations driving the boom in the practice of lobbying.36 Some commentators
consider information conferred through disclosure laws to be the most valuable to competing
interest groups themselves, as opposed to lawmakers or the public at large.37 They argue that
groups will “step up their own lobbying efforts to match those of their competitors,”38 a practice
that would, without disclosure laws, constitute little more than guesswork. When complied with
and enforced, lobbying disclosure laws “can promote the goal of fair competition among interest
groups in the ‘familiar Madisonian fashion of allowing factions to check factions in the service
of the public good.’”39

34

Allard, supra note 28, at 32 (quoting SILENCING THE OPPOSITION: GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES OF SUPPRESSION OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 194-95 (Craig R. Smith ed., 1996)).
35
See W. Laird Stabler, III, From Private Practice to Private Practice (The Governmental Roundtrip), 17
DELAWARE LAW. 15, 17, Fall, 1999 (“Thus, while being an advocate, a lobbyist must always remember that the
statements he or she makes concerning legislative initiatives must be accurate or the lobbyist will lose credibility. A
lack of credibility is certain to destroy a good working relationship with the members of the General Assembly, as it
would with a Judge.”); Allard, supra note 28, at 46 (“In reality, successful advocacy ultimately depends on the
lobbyist's ability to explain how a given position advances the public interest, to respond to counter arguments
advanced by persuasive and skillful advocates, and to do so credibly, consistently, and concisely.”).
36
Briffault, supra note 1, at 117.
37
Id.
38
Id. (quoting Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group Based Approach to Lobbying
Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 542 (2007).
39
Id. Another commentator asserts that, “[i]f, in drafting the Constitution, James Madison had consciously sought
to create a governmental system that would encourage – indeed dictate – that lobbying would become central to
policymaking, he could scarcely have done a better job.” Burdett A. Loomis, From the Framing to the Fifties:
Lobbying in Constitutional and Historical Contexts, EXTENSIONS, Fall 2006, at 1 (2006).
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Another commentator argues that the HLOGA had one major unintended consequence.
Contrary to free market theory, the LDA’s new rules “have not dampened the demand and need
for lobbyists. Instead, greater regulation has actually coincided with a sharp increase in
professional lobbying.”40 The commentator goes on to attribute to the new lobbying rules,
enhanced enforcement, and stricter penalties the transformation of lobbying from “what was
once a cottage industry of government ethics and lobbying training” into “a booming practice
area for Washington law firms.”41
Finally, the general public benefits from lobbying disclosure. For the private citizen, to
know who really has the ear of one’s representative is relevant and valuable information, and the
First Amendment principle of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate is advanced by
requiring disclosure of these activities.42 This information can enhance public understanding of
how government works, educate as to what factors influence government decisions, and provide
an awareness of which groups are engaged in influencing particular policies and which policies
are being pushed.43

HLOGA’s Weaknesses44
Although some disclosure is better than none, pointed criticism can be leveled on the
LDA for its failure to require more precise information regarding bills or agency actions that are

40

Allard, supra note 28, at 24. Ironically enough, Mr. Allard points out that one critical function performed by
lobbyists is to clue in lawmakers to the unintended consequences of proposed legislation. He observes that “[i]t is
sometimes the case that without input from the erstwhile ‘beneficiary’ of a new law or regulation, the provision
would produce unwelcome results.” Id. at 43. However, it is possible that lobbying activities have not spiked in
recent years. Rather, it could be that legislative advocates did not consider themselves lobbyists until the HLOGA
informed them as such.
41
Id. at 24.
42
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 118-19.
43
Id.
44
It is worth noting that weaknesses should probably be anticipated in a bill intended to regulate those who crafted
it.
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the focus of lobbying efforts, the specific lawmakers or agency officials contacted, and the
financial supporters of these advocacy campaigns beyond the actual client.45 Moreover,
enforcement of the regulations has yet to gather steam. The LDA requires the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House to refer cases of noncompliance with the reporting and
disclosure requirements to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for enforcement.46
However, the number of infractions actually investigated by the Secretary or the Clerk is
dramatically outpaced by the extent of noncompliance.47 It is unclear whether enforcement
actions are being effectively pursued by the Justice Department,48 because not until the LDA’s
2007 amendments was there a requirement in place for the Attorney General to report regularly
on the status of enforcement proceedings.49
One especially poorly drafted provision is the requirement that quarterly reports disclose
merely what chamber of Congress or executive agency was the subject of lobbying activities,
providing little or no valuable insight to lawmakers, interest groups, or the general public.50
Moreover, while not providing useful data, the LDA’s duplicative registration filings and
quarterly reports impose a substantial administrative and financial burden on lobbyists and their
employers. Combine a requirement for producing arguably useless data with a requirement to
produce it four times a year, and the result is a mountain of paper that would frighten even a
seasoned investigative reporter with a powerful computer.
Although interest groups with resources to analyze this data are able to glean useful
insight into the activities of their competitors, the goal of the HLOGA was not to enhance and

45

Id. at 115.
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a).
47
See House Report, supra note 8, at 10.
48
Id.
49
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b).
50
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1604(b).
46
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facilitate more lobbying efforts, but “to provide greater transparency in the legislative process,”51
and instill confidence in the political process. One commentator asserts that the voter
information benefit of disclosure is almost surely overstated because the “effectiveness of
disclosure relies, in significant part, on the media’s interest in examining the available
information and presenting it to the public in useful form before the election.”52 Absent such a
labor-intensive endeavor by the media, private citizens stand to gain little from the registration
and disclosure requirements enacted in the HLOGA.
For disclosure laws to be effective in promoting transparency, they must provide facts
that people want to see in times, places, and ways that enable them to act on that information.53
Disclosure is least likely to influence the behavior of those required to disclose or those
employing information disclosed when users face a limited set of choices and so could not act on
new information.54 Disclosure laws – particularly highly-publicized laws like HLOGA – may
have the perverse effect of hiding from elected officials the voters’ views on their campaign
finance sources.55
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, in situations where the identifiable lobbying
client is essentially a front for undisclosed organizations – a “stealth coalition” – requiring the
disclosure of the client without more information as to its financial backers does little more than
supply a starting point for ambitious watchdog groups. Section 207 of the HLOGA sought to
“close a loophole that has allowed so-called ‘stealth coalitions,’ often with innocuous-sounding

51

See Pub. L. No. 110-81 (2007).
Briffault, supra note 1, at 115-16.
53
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 116 (citing ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY, at xiv (2007)).
54
Id.
55
Id.
52
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names, to operate without identifying the interests engaged in lobbying activities.”56 However,
unless a coalition member contributes more than $5,000 to the registered lobbyists or client, or
“actively participates in the planning, supervision, or control” of the coalition’s lobbying
activities, disclosure of such members is not required.57
In a recently decided case, the National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”)
challenged HLOGA section 207 as unconstitutional both facially and as-applied to the NAM.58
The NAM argues on its Web site that “[t]he provision was nominally targeted at ‘stealth
coalitions,’ whatever they are, but missed that mark and hit legitimate, long-standing and wellknown organizations like the NAM that have corporate members.”59 The NAM claimed that if it
were “forced to disclose certain of its member organizations, those members will suffer
retaliation in the form of boycotts and other action against them.”60 In rejecting this argument,
the court noted that despite the fact that the NAM’s publicly available Web site already discloses
more than 250 of its more than 11,000 member organizations, there was no evidence of past
incidents suggesting that affiliation with the group leads to the substantial risk of threats,
harassment, or reprisals from government officials or private parties.61 Furthermore, the section
exempts from disclosure “any information about individuals who are members of, or donors to,
an entity treated as a client.”62 This exception opens the door for like-minded but unaffiliated

56

See Nat’l Assoc. Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying association’s motion for
declaratory and injunctive relief as to 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b)) (quoting 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
2007) (statement of Sens. Feinstein, Lieberman, and Reid)).
57
See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b).
58
See NAM v. Taylor, supra note 56.
59
For the NAM’s interpretation of the new regulations, see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,
National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 2008) -- Issue
Advocacy (2009),
http://beagle.nam.org/results.asp?frm_Parties=Taylor&frm_Topics=Issue+Advocacy&frm_Jurisdiction=Any&frm_
ExcludeSCCases=No&frm_NAMInvolvement=Any&frm_YearDecided=Any&frm_SearchType=MultiCriteria&Su
bmit=Find.
60
NAM, supra note 56, at 75.
61
Id.
62
§ 1603(b)(3)(B).
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entities to create virtually unaccountable shell organizations with which they shield their
lobbying and campaign finance activities from public scrutiny.
In its argument challenging the constitutionality of HLOGA section 207, the NAM
ironically highlights the weaknesses of the new disclosure requirements. The association argues
that section 207
is both over-inclusive, in that it requires reporting by organizations that are by
their nature not “stealth coalitions,” and under-inclusive, in that it exempts
coalitions that do not hire their own lobbyists or that are funded by individual
rather than corporate contributions. It is also extremely vague, and requires the
expenditure of considerable resources to try to determine what it means and how
to monitor the myriad member company activities that might be considered
“active participation” in lobbying activities. Lobbying organizations may comply
simply by listing all their members, including ones that do not meet the $5,000
and active-participation tests, resulting in information to the public that is not
responsive to the purported need to scrutinize “stealth coalitions.”63
As the NAM points out, HLOGA has two loopholes through which coalitions seeking to
influence public policy might slip.64 The more important one is the exception to the required
disclosure of individual members or donors. This provision essentially codifies Supreme Court
holdings and dicta from civil rights-era cases that addressed as-applied First Amendment
challenges to disclosure laws.65 Although grounded on Supreme Court jurisprudence, this
exemption arguably extends a protection intended to preserve the viability of oppressed minority
political parties to organizations that are not historically “the object of harassment by

63

See NAM Interpretation, supra note 59.
§ 1603(b)(3)(B).
65
See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88, 103 (1982) (holding Ohio
disclosure requirements unconstitutional as applied to “a minor political party which historically has been the object
of harassment by government officials and private parties”); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 74 (exempting minor parties from
disclosure requirements if they can show “a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's
contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
parties”); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that a court order compelling the production of the
names and addresses of the Association’s Alabama membership violated due process protections because
compliance would have imposed a substantial restraint on members’ right to freedom of association).
64
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government officials and private parties.”66 Absent a showing of “a reasonable probability that
the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment,
or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties,”67 organizations do not need
Congress to erect statutory barriers to transparent and honest governance in the name of privacy
that the First Amendment already protects. Section 1603(b)(3)(B) works to obfuscate what is
arguably an area where more disclosure – not less – would serve the public interest. Congress
should avoid codifying case law addressing as-applied challenges to disclosure laws because
such rulings are fact-specific,68 and as black letter law are vulnerable to abuse in circumstances
bearing no resemblance with the cases on which the legislation is based. In the NAM’s case, the
real question is why is the association so reluctant to disclose its member organizations?
Building on this question, why should not all such coalitions be required to disclose their
membership?
The argument that revealing the identities of lobbyists, their clients, and supporting
organizations and individuals potentially chills expression of dissident or unpopular views
should not apply when the actions of elected representatives are so heavily influenced –

66

Socialist Workers, supra note 65.
Buckley, supra note 4, at 74.
68
See, e.g., NAACP, supra note 65, where the Alabama Attorney General sued to enjoin the NAACP from
conducting further business in, and to oust the NAACP from, the State of Alabama. Contrary to Alabama law
requiring any foreign corporation to file its charter with the Secretary of State, the NAACP had never complied with
the qualification statute because it considered itself exempt.
The suit alleged, inter alia, that the NAACP had recruited members and solicited contributions within the
State, had given financial support and furnished legal assistance to black students seeking admission to the state
university, and had supported a black boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery to compel the seating of passengers
without regard to race. By continuing to operate in Alabama, the NAACP was “causing irreparable injury to the
property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and
civil actions at law afford no adequate relief.” The court issued an ex parte order restraining the NAACP from
operating within the state and forbidding it from taking any steps to qualifying itself to do business in Alabama. 357
U.S. 449, 452-53.
Under circumstances such as these, it is regrettable that court intervention was required to establish that
state-compelled disclosure of membership or donor identities would violate the First Amendment freedom of
association. However, by codifying this exception to disclosure requirements, Congress overshot the mark in an
attempt to preclude such an unconscionable case from arising in the future.
67
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improperly or not – by advocates ethically and legally bound to zealously represent the interests
of their clients.69 Anonymity can protect “the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”70 But when lawmakers constantly rely on lobbyists to
inform substantive decisions, as they often do,71 the rationale for protecting anonymity to
promote an open and uninhibited exchange of ideas is turned on its head. Lifting the curtain on
lobbyists, whom they lobby, and for what purpose, serves to protect and foster – not undermine –
the underlying First Amendment principle that “valuable public debate – as well as other civic
behavior – must be informed.”72
Although there are legitimate weaknesses in the LDA, at least one commentator argues
that intense competition “to be right” is “perhaps the most effective self-correcting mechanism in
the policy process.”73 Given that the number of registered lobbyists in Washington has doubled
in the last decade, each one must work twice as hard at zealously advocating his client’s
positions.74 Lawmakers and their staffs, “if they are any good, as most are,” rely on a variety of
sources to inform their decision-making processes.75 As California Democrat “Big Daddy” Jesse
Unruh saw it, “if you can’t eat their food, drink their booze, …take their money and then vote
against them, you’ve got no business being up here [in the state legislature].”76

69

See Stabler, supra note 35, at 17.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Although New York Times did not address lobbying
disclosure requirements, it is a leading First Amendment case that provides an excellent analysis of the freedom of
speech in the context of public discourse.
71
See generally Stabler, supra note 35 (providing a first-hand account of the author’s lobbying practice).
72
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
73
See Allard, supra note 28, at 31.
74
Id. at 49.
75
Id. According to Allard, however, the variety of sources is often comprised entirely of lobbyists. Id. at 43 (“The
truth of the matter is that legislation in Washington is extraordinarily complex…the only way [lawmakers and their
staffs] can really get to the bottom of a lot of complex issues is to rely on lobbyists.”) (quoting Kenneth Gross, a
leading expert on lobbying and election law).
76
Allard, supra note 28, at n.20 (quoting BILL BOYARSKY, BIG DADDY: JESSE UNRUH AND THE ART OF POWER
POLITICS (2008)). Unruh, whose career as a leading Democrat spanned four decades, served as California’s
Assembly Speaker and State Treasurer. Allard mentions two other statements, the likes of which will never see a
serious public forum again. The first is longtime House Speaker Sam Rayburn’s policy on accepting gifts: “You just
70
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With this positive development, however, comes an arguably negative corollary:
increased competition between lobbyists for legislative staff and members’ time, which raises the
question of just how directly campaign contributions are connected to “access.”77 Although the
commentator initially downplays the relationship between campaign contributions and access to
lawmakers and their staffs, he acknowledges that “a surprising number of lobbyists admit flat-out
that they hate the system as it is, and would even endorse a complete campaign finance overhaul,
which perhaps might even include a prohibition of political contributions by professional
lobbyists.”78 This distaste for the current system is based in part on the characterization of
campaign donations as “the gift that keeps on taking,” in that once a lobbyist’s contribution is
disclosed, fundraisers and candidates often identify the lobbyist as a potential source of funds.79

Part II: The Nexus Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance
Public Concern Over Improper Influence
The tension between core democratic principles of political equality – “one person, one
vote” – and the rights to petition the government and make campaign contributions give rise to
the central concern that lobbyists who are heavily engaged in campaign finance distort the
democratic process.80 Because large campaign contributions, particularly “bundled”
contributions, can facilitate “access” to lawmakers, there is a legitimate worry that those with the
deepest pockets exert the most influence on the legislative process, to the detriment of the public

don’t take it unless you can eat it, drink it, or smoke it in twenty-four hours.” The second is a campaign
advertisement for a Pennsylvania candidate: “Drink Their Beer, Carry Their Signs, and Take Their Money, But Vote
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Id. at 108-12.
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at large.81 Campaign money works with lobbying to promote the election of public officials that
are more amenable or sympathetic to the donors’ goals, particularly because of the ability of
large contributions to “open doors” for those who can make them, an ability that lobbyists
themselves acknowledge.82
Anyone who followed the 2008 Democratic nomination contest saw several of the
leading candidates butt heads over the propriety of accepting campaign contributions from
lobbyists.83 Barack Obama moved to seize the moral high ground on the issue of special interest
influence when he said that lobbyists routinely manipulate bills and that large corporations
essentially run the legislative and policymaking show, and he once claimed that he would not
work with or employ federal lobbyists in his administration.84 These strong public
pronouncements in the heat of a campaign were politically shrewd, especially considering that
exit polls from the 2006 election cycle revealed that 80% of Americans believe that lobbyists
exercise undue influence on public policy,85 and 81% of respondents to a January 2006 Pew
Research Center poll believe it is common for lobbyists to bribe members of Congress.86
Although Obama followed through on his promise to refuse donations from federally-registered
lobbyists, both he and Hilary Clinton received vast sums of money from attorneys representing
large corporations, and who frequently worked for firms employing registered lobbyists.87
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Clinton defended her acceptance of lobbyist money by arguing that the real issue was
special interests, not the lobbyists representing them.88 This argument is bolstered by the fact
that, although Obama never accepted contributions from de jure lobbyists, he took nearly
$65,000 from lawyers at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.89 Akin Gump lawyers represent
large oil companies such as Lukoil, while lobbyists employed by the firm represent some of the
biggest and baddest corporations around: oil giants Exxon and BP, agribusiness behemoth
Archer Daniels Midland, and aerospace and defense titan Boeing.90 While the Clinton camp
criticized Obama’s lobbyist-related campaign promises as a naïve overstatement, and while it is
possible to find hypocrisy in his campaign finance disclosures, he arguably deserves credit for
“at least taking a stand” on the issue.91
In a recent television interview, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) expressed a widely held and
judicially recognized92 belief that lobbyists and large donors wield misrepresentative and
improper influence on government decision makers, here in the context of the financial bailout
package.
Those lobbyists have a lot of money behind them, and then the ordinary citizen[s],
on whose back this bailout price tag has been placed, have nobody lobbying for
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them but their members of congress, and we need to get that [bailout] money out
now, down into the communities that are being affected.93
Although the federal laws governing campaign finance and lobbying generally treat those
activities as separate and distinct, the public does not appear to recognize this formalistic legal
distinction, and it certainly does not reflect the reality of lobbying and campaign finance. Given
that campaign finance and lobbying regulations are justified on the ground that they buttress
public confidence in the democratic process,94 there is a strong case for addressing these
interconnected issues in a more comprehensive and pragmatic manner.

The Real Problem with Lobbying and Campaign Finance
Most lobbyists do not make campaign contributions,95 but the most active lobbyists are
frequent and generous donors.96 A recent Public Citizen survey found that from 1998 through
2005, about one-quarter of federally-registered lobbyists contributed an amount sufficient to
trigger the reporting requirement, $200 or more,97 to a single congressional candidate or political
action committee.98 Although that figure may not surprise an interested voter, the study also
revealed that 6% of all federally registered lobbyists accounted for 83% of all lobbyists’
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campaign contributions.99 Furthermore, while there are interest groups with lobbyists that
advocate on behalf of nearly every facet of society,100 not all of those groups have the financial
resources to compete day in and day out in the campaign finance arms race. It is clear that
money can matter to a degree that is in tension with the formal political equality of citizens.101
The House Judiciary Committee’s report on HLOGA (“House Report”) cites a study by
the Center for Public Integrity, published in April 2006, that found that since 1998, lobbyists had
“spent nearly $13 billion to influence Members of Congress and other Federal officials on
legislation and regulation…. This is roughly twice as much as the already vast amount that was
spent on Federal political campaigns in the same time period.”102
Although the figures above are remarkable, the underlying trend is alarming to some,103
and reassuring to others.104 The amount of money being spent to influence both elections and
legislation is exploding. Campaign contributions from lobbyists and their firms’ PACs nearly
doubled from $17.8 million in the 2000 election cycle to $33.9 million in the 2004 cycle.105
There are at least two explanations for the leap, although the second does not render the trend
any less troubling. First, the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act doubled individual
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contribution limits between 2000 and 2004.106 Second, these figures could be distorted as
unregistered lobbyists that contributed in the 2000 election cycle formally register before the
2004 cycle, which would artificially inflate the upward trend in lobbyists’ campaign donations.
Between 2000 and 2004, the number of lobbyists in Washington more than doubled, from around
16,000 to almost 35,000.107 The second explanation is supported by the House Report, which
notes that nearly 14,000 documents that should have been filed are missing, almost 300
individuals, companies, or other entities have lobbied without being registered, and more than
2,000 initial registrations were filed after the legal deadline.108
Although Mr. Allard cites the ability of an increasingly competitive marketplace for
lobbying services to cleanse itself of unscrupulous practitioners, he implicitly acknowledges that
with twice as many lobbyists in Washington, “access” on Capitol Hill could legitimately be
characterized as twice as expensive.109 “According to the prevailing popular view, access is
almost always a function of campaign contributions. Experience and data, however, suggest
otherwise.”110 To support this argument, the author cites results of a Policy Council survey
finding that 13% of Hill staffers rated campaign contributions as a determining factor, while just
1% found it to be the most important factor.111 The survey found that the most important
determining factor for access, cited by 56% of respondents, was the “importance of the
organization [represented] to the member’s state or district,” while the second most important
factor was the lobbyist’s reputation for providing credible, reliable information.112 What makes
any given organization important to a member is a subjective determination that is likely to vary
106
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according to a number of different considerations. The one constant, however, is that “it is
unrealistic to dismiss the role of campaign contributions in the lobbying process,” and research
has confirmed the connection between PAC contributions and lobbying access.113 Although
money and resulting access do not “buy votes,”114 the connection between campaign
contributions and influence is impossible to deny.

Part III: Suggestions for Improvement
Mandatory, universal government finance of election campaigns with a prohibition on
outside funding for direct candidate advocacy would go a long way toward eliminating the
problems raised when lobbyists heavily engage themselves in campaign finance. Although such
an approach would restrict the First Amendment right to “political speech” expressed through
campaign donations, applying this restriction without exception would not disadvantage an
identifiable portion of society, and would serve a compelling interest in restoring public
confidence in the democratic process. Moreover, public financing of elections would remove
perverse incentives for lobbyists, who are duty bound to zealously advocate their clients’
positions, and who are all too aware that campaign donations allow them to better discharge this
duty. Furthermore, removing money from the equation would place emphasis where it should be
– on the merits of lobbyists’ arguments rather than on their “loyalty” to a particular candidate or
campaign.
One commentator noted how Obama’s rejection of lobbyists’ campaign donations
compelled an approach he called “messaging over money.”115 “Since no lobbyist can give
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money to Obama’s presidential campaign or to the Democratic National Committee,” he wrote,
“our ideas and suggestions will have to be accepted or rejected on their merits and not because of
any perceived special standing based on a campaign contribution.”116 If lobbying is to remain an
integral part of the policymaking process – which it undoubtedly should if lawmakers are to
make informed decisions – lobbying efforts should stand or fall on their substance, not on
whether the lobbyist helped a particular candidate get elected through fundraising efforts.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective and egalitarian public finance of elections is
determining eligibility for taxpayer dollars. Candidates not affiliated with the Republican or
Democratic parties would probably be the losers in a public finance regime, and this would
arguably hurt the democratic process by effectively silencing viewpoints outside the mainstream
political ideologies. This concern is mitigated by the fact that independent candidates have
rarely enjoyed political success on a national scale. In the event that the established political
parties diverge from the popular will, however, publicly-financed elections could create a
dangerous scenario where neither publicly-financed candidate represents the majority of the
public. These issues could probably be resolved with the adoption of flexible regulations that
acknowledge the potential for major party divergence from political undercurrents for
determining who receives public financing.
In the absence of a wholesale departure from the current system, the federal government
should look to the states for better ways of regulating the intersection of lobbying and campaign
finance. Federalism principles underlying the Constitution allow the states to test innovative and
novel legislative solutions to social and economic challenges, essentially rendering the states
116
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laboratories in which state legislatures may conduct these experiments.117 To this end, a number
of states have enacted laws imposing a variety of campaign finance restrictions specifically
targeting lobbyists, bundled contributions, or combinations of the two.118
Some of these restrictions have a temporal element. Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and
Wisconsin prohibit lobbyists from making, and legislators from accepting, campaign
contributions while the legislature is in session.119 Others take disclosure requirements a step
further than HLOGA. Washington and Rhode Island require lobbyists to disclose campaign
contributions in their regular lobbying reports,120 and Washington goes further by requiring
disclosure of bundled contributions as well.121 The Maryland legislature considers lobbyists’
bundled contributions to be so worrisome as to warrant their outright ban,122 and North Carolina
lawmakers prohibit any campaign contributions to elected officials by lobbyists.123 Alaska
prohibits a lobbyist from making campaign contributions to any candidate for state legislature
other than candidates running to represent the district where the lobbyist is eligible to vote.124
Michigan’s legislation sweeps more broadly to require the reporting and disclosure of bundled
contributions generally, without specifically targeting lobbyists.125 Finally, Minnesota limits the
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proportion of campaign contributions a candidate can receive from lobbyists, PACs, political
funds, and large contributors.126
In applying some of these state approaches to federal regulation of lobbying and
campaign finance, three provisions appear the most appropriate. First, the federal government
should ban the practice of bundling contributions for delivery by lobbyists. Doing so would
work to sever the connection between large contributions and improved access to lawmakers
receiving them. Donors would still be able to make campaign contributions, but would have to
face public scrutiny of their decisions and motivations in doing so. Second, Minnesota’s
proportional cap on contributions from what could be characterized as institutional donors should
be implemented at the federal level. This provision would allow well-funded groups to have
their voices heard, but not at a volume that drowns out contributions from the average citizendonor. It would encourage fundraisers to venture into the general public for campaign money,
which would both pull more people into the political process and foster connections between
candidates and the constituents they seek to represent in government. Third, if bundled
contributions are to remain as an element of campaign finance, they should be disclosed across
the board without regard for whether the delivering agent is a lobbyist or PAC representative,
and an exhaustive list of donors should be included in the report. The disproportionate influence
potentially accrued through the delivery of extraordinarily large donations warrants their
disclosure generally. If groups or individuals are capable of making or facilitating large
contributions, and given that only individuals have the right to vote, no legitimate interest is
served by permitting donors to hide behind bundled contributions. As long as big donors are
pursuing legitimate ends, what worries them about disclosure?
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Adopting any of these state provisions at the federal level would make the legislative and
political process more transparent and would improve the effectiveness of federal lobbying and
campaign finance regulation. Moreover, it would untie the merits of lobbying efforts from the
ability to finance election campaigns and eliminate actual or perceived improper influence from
the necessary involvement of experts in the legislative process.

Part IV: Conclusion
Lobbyists and other interest groups have a First Amendment right both to advocate their
positions to government officials and to contribute financial support to any candidate they
choose. Under the distinct regulatory regimes governing them, lobbying and campaign finance,
in isolation from one another, probably do not pose a significant danger to the administration of
representative democracy. However, given that the current regimes allow individuals,
organizations, and interest groups to pair campaign finance with lobbying to advance their
private goals to the detriment of the broader public interest, it is clear that today’s federal
framework is inadequate.127 Potential sources of influence over public officials such as bundling
campaign contributions can and should be regulated generally, not just when practiced by
lobbyists.128 On the other hand, argues Professor Briffault, “there may be some situations where
the campaign activities of lobbyists provide special influence for lobbyists above and beyond the
benefits to their clients; in those cases, regulations aimed at lobbyists may be appropriate.”129
The real question for today’s advocates of limited disclosure is, what do you want to hide, and
why?

127

See Briffault, supra note 1, at 121.
Id. at 107.
129
Id.
128

25

